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The role and the state in the Great Divergence 
‘The Great Divergence’ is a somewhat vague topic, because even if we 
could agree on all the facts, there would be problems of definition: do we 
date it from when standards of living in one place first diverged by some 
arbitrarily chosen amount from those in another place? By when the things 
that explain those differences in living standards first occurred? Or by when 
it becomes clear that the gap will not close quickly? One could, after all, 
argue that what makes for a great divergence has to be more than just an 
important change that happens in place A before place B – there have to be 
some kind of increasing returns that mean, at least for a while, that the 
divergence will keep growing (and thus become ‘great’). The questions to 
what extent the gaps that open in the nineteenth century close, and to what 
extent that re-convergence (or lack thereof) is built into the initial 
divergence, are thus as much a part of our story as the more common 
question of why the gaps appear. So I will be looking at a very long sweep 
of history here – first both in Europe and China (with occasional nods to 
other places) and then, once the European Industrial Revolution is well 
underway, almost exclusively in East Asia.  
The first part of this talk will summarize (while adding a few new 
wrinkles) an argument I have already published, which is about how 
surprisingly similar the economies of the most advanced regions of China 
and Europe were as late as about 1750, this suggests that we re-think the 
large differences that were apparent seventy-five years later. The second 
part will then suggest implications of this revised eighteenth century for 
China’s catastrophic nineteenth century, and for the generally happier story 
of economic development in twentieth century East Asia – by most 
standards, the most successful area outside Europe and the so-called neo-
Europes, and one in which some people see a distinct style of development. 
(Note that the idea of a distinct, but successful East Asian development 
path would close the divergence in the usual, quantitative sense, but leave 
important qualitative differences in place.) The second part will consider 
some limits of this ‘East Asian path’: both as an analytic construct and as a 





suggesting that despite today’s global flows of commodities, technologies, 
etc., the divergence is sufficiently ‘great’ that its legacies include some 
significant barriers to reconvergence. 
Since the 1960s, European economic historians have moved away 
from treating industrialization as a British-centered big bang, re-inserting it 
in long stories of slowly-growing markets, division of labour, many small 
innovations, and the accumulating of small profits. Such gradual market-
driven growth was surely crucial, but it did not differentiate Europe from 
East Asia. Smithian dynamics worked there, too, but did not transform 
basic possibilities: eventually, highly developed areas everywhere faced 
resource constraints, in part because commercialization and proto-
industrialization accelerated population growth, and most food, fuel, fibre 
and building materials still came from the land. Britain, I argue, needed for 
its escape not only technology and institutions, but coal, the New World, 
and various favourable conjunctures – in Flanders and even Holland proto-
industrialization led to results more like the Yangzi Delta or Japan’s Kinai 
region than like England. (It is important here to compare like with like: e.g. 
we compare Jiangnan and England or Jiangnan and the Netherlands, as the 
most economically advanced areas within their respective parts of the 
world, not China and England. Given the size, population, ecological 
diversity and so on of China, it makes more sense to compare it to Europe 
as a whole. Other parts of China also have their European counterparts – 
grain-exporting but relatively poor Hunan might be worth placing side by 
side with Poland, and so on. Only when we are talking about government 
policies is it necessary to make the comparison one between political units, 
much less units that became modern national states.)  
If even vigorous Smithian growth does not necessarily lead to 
industrialization, then the Industrial Revolution again becomes a 
discontinuity to be explained – because it is just as easy to see Europe as 
‘China manqué’ as vice versa, or England as Flanders.  
In a powerful synthesis of the gradualist story, Jan de Vries has 
embedded the Industrial Revolution in a larger ‘industrious revolution’ – an 
idea which helps resolve a paradox. The grain-buying power of European 
day wages fell sharply from 1430 to 1550, and did not return to 1430 levels 
until the nineteenth century – or even the twentieth, depending on which 
place you are talking about. But if grain-deflated wages do not suggest much 
early modern economic progress, other measurements do: death 
inventories, for instance, show significant increases in people’s possessions. 




This could occur because people spent more hours per year working for the 
market, generating cash that bought new possessions as well as stable 
amounts of increasingly expensive bread. People may have had less leisure, 
and definitely spent less time making goods for their own households – in 
other words, they specialize more and buy other things, some of which 
‘saved time’ on domestic chores. 
Something similar happened in China (and maybe elsewhere). Rice-
deflated day wages mostly fell after about 1100, but in circa 1750 earnings 
for farmers and textile producers in the Yangzi Delta still matched up well 
against England. (In agriculture rough parity in labour productivity per day 
lasted into the 1820s.) Our very limited evidence suggests that nutritional 
standards held up, and did not lag Europe’s. Rough nutritional parity is also 
suggested by Chinese life expectancies, which were close to England’s (and 
above most of the Continent’s) until almost 1800, and indirectly by birth 
rates. Contrary to mythology, Chinese birth rates were apparently no higher 
than European ones between 1550 and 1850, while population grew a bit 
faster, suggesting that Chinese death rates were at least no higher. 
Perhaps even more interesting though, is the evidence of increased 
consumption of ‘non-essentials’ by ordinary Chinese between about 1500 
and 1750: from travellers’ accounts, elite complaints about popular 
consumption, etc. For those commodities where I could construct 
measurements, China in circa 1750 stacked up well against Europe, and 
Jiangnan against England.  
But of course these parallels did not last. Between 1750 and 1900, 
production, consumption, and specialization all jumped forward in Europe, 
while in China per capita non-grain consumption declined. Figures from 
1900 for cloth and sugar, for instance, are below even my most conservative 
estimates for 1750. 
Much of the difference is ecological, but not in the sense that 
‘population pressure’ was producing more serious problems within Chinese 
cores than in European ones. I have reconstructed nitrogen fluxes from 
dry-farming areas of North China and England, in circa 1800, and they do 
not show more severe soil depletion in China: if I threw in South China’s 
paddy rice regions the comparison would lop-sidedly favour China. Even 
for deforestation, there is no clear Western European advantage circa 1750, 
despite its much sparser population – the Chinese used land and fuel very 
sparingly and efficiently, and they were probably doing just as well at 





been deteriorating less rapidly, though energy was, very expensive in 
eighteenth century China, and the potential for economic breakthroughs 
based on using much more of it were poor. A feature of Western Europe’s 
nineteenth century breakthrough that is too little remarked on, is that some 
important ecological variables stabilized despite unprecedented growth in 
both population and per capita consumption, while much slower early 
modern growth had produced serious accelerating strain. Archaeological 
evidence points to serious soil degradation in eighteenth century France and 
Germany, which confirms reports of stagnant or declining yields; forests 
shrank dramatically, sandstorms became more common, etc. Why did much 
of this stabilize in the nineteenth century?  
One crucial factor was the switch in a few areas to sub-terranean 
energy sources: above all, English coal. But there was a lot of luck in this: 
Chinese coal deposits are just too many land-locked miles away from core 
regions to be economical before railways; and mines so remote from 
concentrations of skilled artisans were not well-positioned for technological 
change, anyway. Moreover, in eighteenth century Chinese coal mines, being 
mostly in very dry areas, people wrestled with sudden gas explosions, not 
(as in England) with flooding. And it was pumping water which created 
perfect conditions for refining a bulky, initially very inefficient steam engine. 
The early ones converted less than 1% of the energy they used to motion, 
and in 1800, 80% of them were at the pit-head, where fuel was virtually free. 
However, having some place where they were worth deploying also made 
them worth improving, eventually creating a machine that transformed any 
number of processes. (Many of the improvements in steam engine 
construction were also spin-offs from advances in armament production; 
for instance, techniques that greatly improved the pistons, and thus the 
perfection of the temporary vacuum in the engine, were originally 
developed for the precision-boring of cannon barrels. This is one of several 
ways that Europe’s unusually intense military competitition, quite 
destructive in the short run, provided some accidental but important 
benefits in the longer run.) 
The Yangzi Delta, by contrast, lacked all kinds of energy – coal, 
timber and water power. The Yangzi is quite flat across its last several 
hundred miles, and also extremely seasonal, with high and low water in 
many places differing by as much as sixty meters – which did not make the 
use of water power impossible, but did make it less likely to be widely 
pursued. (The region also has almost no metallic ores.) In some ways the 




Delta, and coastal China more generally, adapted quite successfully by 
finding ways to conduct daily life with limited energy use, rather than by 
generating more energy. However, this did not put it on the road to a 
modern world of energy intensity; for instance the region simply never 
developed much heavy industry; it simply was not advantageous for kinds 
of production that required lots of energy to locate in that region, and few 
did. In Guangzhou in 1704, the general cost of living was about 20% of the 
London level in silver, while charcoal cost 528% of its London price. Under 
the circumstances, why would you look for ways to use more energy as a 
substitute for labour?  
Secondly, Western Europe benefited from soaring imports of land-
intensive products, especially from the New World. As demand for food, 
fibre, building materials and fuel – Malthus’s ‘four necessities’ – grew with 
population, cores everywhere, to one degree or another, had to acquire 
these land-intensive products by trading with a periphery that wanted the 
manufactures, mostly textiles, that cores produced. 
But that trade tended to run into one of two problems. In a place like 
Eastern Europe, with many barriers to factor mobility and many people 
outside the cash economy, the response to external demand is limited – and 
indeed, the Baltic trade plateaued by 1650, at a fraction of the size of 
China’s long-distance staple trades. But over the longer haul, the freer trade 
of advanced Chinese regions with their interior also hit limits. With 
hinterland families more or less free to allocate their own labour, the export 
boom and commercialization stimulated population growth in places like 
North China and the Middle Yangzi during the eighteenth century; and as 
the best land filled up, some labour switched into handicrafts, reducing raw 
materials surpluses for export and reducing demand for imported textiles. 
What had been by far the world’s largest long-distance staple trade plateaus 
and then declines as the peripheries gain population and develop more 
handicrafts; moreover, the terms of trade shift sharply against manufactures 
and thus against the Yangzi Delta: the same day pieces of cloth bought half 
as much rice in 1840 as in 1750. This constrained the development of the 
core regions: Yangzi Delta population barely grew from 1750 to 1850, and 
the share of labour in non-agriculture probably fell slightly. (Moreover as 
the Delta became a smaller part of China’s population, its relatively high 
consumption levels had less weight in Chinese aggregates, which helps 
explain how those aggregates could fall significantly without observers in 





The Americas, however, were different. Smallpox etc., depopulated 
the region, and much of the labour force was replaced by slaves – who were 
purchased from abroad. Moreover, New World slaves engaged in less 
subsistence production than coerced cash-crop workers in old world did; 
thus despite their poverty, they were a significant market for coarse cloth 
etc. Consequently, the circum-Caribbean slave region (from Brazil to what 
became the US south) became the first periphery to look like a modern one 
– spending a lot on imported capital goods (in this case human, kidnapped, 
capital goods) and a fair amount on mass consumer goods, paid for with 
continually growing land-intensive exports. Meanwhile, the Yangzi Delta 
ran into problems with import substitution in at least some of its 
peripheries. Somewhat similarly, Japan’s advanced Kinai and Kanto regions 
have no population growth from 1720-1860, while various outer Han 
gained population, developed their own handicraft industries as domainal 
monopolies lapsed, and saw their rice surpluses shrink significantly. So East 
Asia’s most advanced regions may have suffered from markets working very 
well while factor endowments were not different enough among regions: 
this led to an increasing dispersion of proto-industry and an ecological cul de 
sac, while Europe reaped benefits from limits on markets and import 
substitution (e.g. bound labour, colonial monopolies).  
Normalizing China this way, suggests the importance of relaxing land 
constraints – both through mining and the New World – for British and 
later Northwest European growth. Even in 1830 – before the great mid-
century boom in North American grain, meat, and timber exports, and the 
tenfold increase in England’s sugar consumption over the rest of the 
century – local substitutes for Britain’s New World imports would have 
required about 23,000,000 acres (mostly to replace cotton imports). That 
figure exceeds even the 15,000,000 acres of forest that Wrigley estimates 
were rendered unnecessary by coal production circa 1815; it also exceeds 
Britain’s total arable and pasture land put together. Without such new 
resources, ecological constraints might have hobbled English growth, much 
as the filling up of the Chinese interior hobbled the Yangzi Delta.  
Jeff Williamson and Kevin O’Rourke have recently offered 
confirming evidence for this argument using a rather different method. In a 
2005 paper, they look at British wage to rent ratios to see when and how a 
more or less Malthusian world – in which population growth drove this 
ratio down relentlessly – gave way to a modern one, in which the value of 
labour could rise faster than that of land even as population grew. 




Essentially, they find that after 1730 wage/rent ratios started to decline a bit 
less than a Malthusian model would predict; after 1800, a lot less, and after 
1840, they began to improve substantially, rising 394% by 1936 when they 
‘should’ have fallen by another 54%. What is truly striking, though, is their 
finding that the expansion of Britain’s trans-Atlantic trade – they do not 
even factor in other trans-oceanic trade, or the effects of emigration in 
easing population pressure – accounted for almost half of this divergence 
from the predictions of a Malthusian model – as much as technological 
change, organizational innovation, improvements in worker health and 
education, and all other productivity-enhancing changes put together. 
Without insisting on this precise measurement, I think this strongly 
confirms the point that access to primary products from elsewhere (which, 
as I have emphasized, essentially substitute for land at home, and in 
Williamson and O’Rourke’s model prevent rents from skyrocketing with 
demand for basic commodities) is a very important part of explaining how 
technological changes could lead to sustained growth without creating 
unbearable environmental strains. 
China’s ecological problems became severe in the nineteenth century 
– not primarily in the densely populated cores, but in areas like the over-
logged northwest and southwest, and the North China cotton country. 
There was also a sharp drop in the water table in the semi-arid North and 
West as their populations grew: by the late 1700s we have many reports that 
wells had to be re-dug, and over the next century we see many lakes 
shrinking or disappearing. So the basic picture is one of European and 
Chinese cores that had much in common, but were hitched to very different 
kinds of peripheries. China’s cores were filling up, turning to handicrafts, 
hitting ecological constraints, and exporting fewer primary products; 
Europe’s were vastly expanded, ecologically rich, and set up institutionally 
in ways that encouraged a continued export orientation. So New World 
trade – shaped by smallpox, slavery, and various other peculiar conjunctures 
– was critical after all. This was not because it was super-profitable, as 
dependency models claimed, but because it offered a special kind of trading 
partner – one which allowed European cores to change labour and capital 
into land-saving imports in a way that expanded trade closer to home could 
not, and in a way that Jiangnan and Lingnan were finding it harder to do.  
Turning back to East Asia, we know that after the mid-nineteenth 
century shocks, Japan’s economy began to grow faster than ever, benefiting 





trading partners with different factor endowments. China had a much 
rougher late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Some of the reasons are 
rooted in the complexly interwoven systems of land tenure, demography, 
migration, and fiscality that had shaped its eighteenth century successes.  
To greatly oversimplify, most farmers in China’s poorer regions were 
small-holders. In the most advanced areas, there were far more tenants, but 
most of them had relative security of tenure; this helped keep rents rising a 
bit more slowly than yields over the long haul. (Wage labourers, fully 
dependent on the market for access to the means of production, were about 
10% of the Yangzi Delta population, versus over half of the eighteenth 
century British labour force, and a ‘very substantial minority’ in the 
Netherlands.) With strong usufruct rights, tenants, though to Western eyes 
‘propertyless’ earned far more than wage labourers: about 2.5 times as 
much, according to estimates with eighteenth century data from the Lower 
Yangzi and coastal Fujian. (The same ratios emerge from the much better 
data in 1920s and 1930s surveys.) Consequently, while Chinese wages may 
well have already lagged Western European ones significantly by the 1750s, 
there was probably no ‘great divergence’ in average living standards until 
much later. 
Consider a few consequences of this huge difference between the 
large tenant class and the very small class of labourers. For one, while 
tenants earned enough to support a family, landless labourers did not – and 
in a society with a shortage of marriageable women (due to concubinage 
and sex-selective infanticide) most rural proletarians (often called ‘bare 
sticks’) did not reproduce. In some sense, this stabilized the system, because 
the ranks of the dispossessed maintained despite on-going 
commercialization: some hapless smallholders and tenants became rural 
proletarians in each generation, but since the existing labourers did not 
reproduce themselves, they remained about 10% of rural folk all the way to 
1949. In another sense, however, these alienated ‘bare sticks’ had so little to 
lose that they sometimes did threaten social and political peace – as did 
those who over-reacted to them.  
Equally critical, this huge gap between rural wages in the strict sense 
and the earnings of the vast majority also kept urban labourers’ wages low, 
and meant that tenants had no reason to head for the cities unless they 
could expect to find something much better than unskilled labour there: this 
kept rural-urban migration low, even though the agricultural surplus could 
feed many non-farmers. (Even in the 1930s, less than 1% of Shanghai 




rickshaw pullers came from the nearby Yangzi Delta countryside, though 
migrants from there dominated many skilled jobs). Industry instead 
developed as rural industry, with its work force embedded in farm families. 
It also meant that people from other parts of the empire would gain little by 
moving to the wealthiest regions unless they could put down a substantial 
tenancy deposit: though per capita income in Jiangnan was probably about 
50% higher than the empire-wide average in the 1700s, unskilled wages 
were no higher there. This explains the otherwise puzzling fact that for 
centuries, net migration was away from the richest parts of the country: for 
those near the bottom of the heap, it was better to head for the frontier 
where hard work could often get you a land title (or later, go overseas) than 
go to places that were richer but offered few footholds for outsiders 
without capital.  
Large inter-regional income differences fit with a fiscal system in 
which the Lower Yangzi paid by far the highest taxes in the empire, while 
also providing almost all of its own public services. The Delta’s ‘extra’ taxes 
subsidized social, economic and ecological stabilization in poorer regions: 
flood control on the Yellow River (while communities along the Yangzi 
paid for their own flood control), subsidies for well-digging in the semi-arid 
North and Northwest, an emergency granary system that focused on poorer 
and less commercialized regions (assuming that rich areas could handle their 
own food security), and so on.  
All this sounds extremely stable, but by 1850 the system had crashed. 
As we saw before, population growth in the interior shrank the primary 
products for light manufactures trade with coastal cores, and worsened the 
terms of trade for the coast. This made the Lower Yangzi’s fiscal burdens 
increasingly painful, while hinterland population growth made ecological 
stabilization in poorer regions ever more challenging: Yellow River control 
alone took 10-20% of Qing revenues in circa 1820-1850. Meanwhile, the 
coming of the West (marked by the Opium War of 1839-1842) forced the 
Qing into new and expensive commitments on another coastal kind of 
frontier. The result was a political/economic/ecological perfect storm and a 
very grim century indeed. 
But we should also note that, after surviving its mid-century shocks – 
shocks which were much greater than Japan’s, for these and other reasons – 
China’s most advanced regions also resumed economic growth, imported 
some new technologies, and benefited from new trading partners that 





Rice from Southeast Asia, for instance, began to feed Shanghai, Canton, and 
other coastal towns, replacing the shipments from the interior that had 
shrunk by over 80% circa by 1750-1900. Coastal areas began to get timber 
and other land-intensive products from overseas. New destinations for both 
emigrants and light manufactured exports opened up (including ‘native 
products’ sold to the emigrants themselves). The parts of China that 
remained in chronic crisis were some of its hinterlands. 
Some interior regions, like the Middle Yangzi, resumed earlier 
patterns of growth after the mid-century rebellions and then plateaued. 
Others, especially in the North, had real catastrophes, in part because 
ecological and political problems fed on each other. As the Chinese state 
began to recover from mid-century incursions and rebellions, it changed its 
priorities, refocusing on newly strategic coastal regions and encouraging 
‘modern’ development there. Conversely, it reduced the ‘reproductive’ 
commitments I described earlier: using revenues from rich regions to 
underwrite flood control, granary reserves, irrigation, and other efforts to 
stabilize family farming and Confucian society in more fragile areas. 
Spending on the Yellow River, for instance, fell by over 50% from 1850-
1937, even while total taxes collected rose by roughly 1,000% (both 
measured in gold); despite some gains in dollar for dollar effectiveness, the 
results of such cuts were horrific. Thus, certain interior areas suffered 
simultaneously from declining inter-regional trade, population growth, and 
losing state services needed in ecologically fragile areas. A vicious circle of 
political, social, economic and ecological decay followed, reflected not just 
in poor Gross National Product (GNP) performance but even more in 
vastly intensified mortality crises, and social instability which ultimately 
affected almost all institutions in inland areas. Xia Mingfang’s figures 
indicate that a dozen times as many Chinese starved between 1865 and 1937 
as between 1644 and 1800 – almost all of them in the North and 
Northwest.  
Thus, one sees in this period a severe case of a phenomenon much 
discussed with respect to recent years: a decoupling of coastal and interior 
China, involving both the re-orientation of the coast toward external trading 
partners and a decline in once-crucial inter-regional transfer payments. 
Coastal China, both the parts seized by foreigners – Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
the treaty ports, and more briefly Manchuria – and the rest, achieved 
substantial per capita growth (possibly even rivaling Japan’s growth rates in 
the interwar Lower Yangzi), despite serious violence and dislocation. (They 




did not, however, experience any structural transformation like Japan’s, in 
part due to much weaker public services.) Interior regions, meanwhile, 
experienced considerably worse disorder, and little or perhaps negative 
growth; and, as the figures on disasters show, GNP trends greatly 
understate the degree of distress. 
In larger regional terms, we see in this period the emergence of an 
East/Southeast Asian littoral economy which, despite huge problems, 
achieved fairly impressive economic growth and increasing integration. 
Intra-Asian trade grew faster than world trade, 1880-1937, albeit off a lower 
base; industries in Japan as well as coastal China (and for that matter, 
Bombay, too) found their principal markets in that intra-Asian trade, not in 
the West. Moreover, many of the industries had a substantial rural 
component – Japanese silk and Chinese ‘native’ cotton cloth are the most 
obvious, but also modern goods like matches, which in both countries often 
had the heads glued on the sticks by peasant girls.  
On one level, the integration of maritime East and Southeast Asia 
continued, at an accelerated pace, growing connections that date back to the 
late eighteenth century. The emergence of clearer landed property rights in 
parts of Southeast Asia, cheaper transport, and so on, encouraged 
immigration, the growing of cash crops for export, and so on; all these 
trends had eighteenth century roots but accelerated after about 1865. (The 
same was true in Manchuria, where a process of settlement going on since 
seventeenth century also sped up after 1860, as the Qing eased restrictions, 
and even more so after 1905.) 
On a global level, these patterns of growth reflect East Asia having 
found a particular niche within an Atlantic-centered world economy. East 
Asian countries and colonies did not contest Western dominance of the 
high value-added and militarily critical industries of the second Industrial 
Revolution (steel, heavy chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment) nor 
of high finance and insurance, nor the privileged Western access to lands 
with the best population to resources ratios (obtained through colonialism 
and maintained in part through discriminatory immigration policies). On the 
other hand, East Asians never became raw materials exporters themselves, 
and as long as they focused on light industry, faced relatively open global 
markets; as Cain and Hopkins remind us, the City of London shaped British 
foreign economic policy much more than manufacturers did, and was happy 
to see Osaka and Shanghai grow as long as the Hong Kong and Shanghai 





This does not mean, however – as descriptions of this ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ sometimes suggest – that once the ‘opening’ of East Asia was 
over, imperialism became just a benign matter of free trade. We have 
already seen how the fiscal demands of survival amidst predatory foreign 
powers helped destabilize much of the Chinese interior and decouple it 
from the coast; the massive sufferings caused by each successive stage of 
the opium epidemic are well known; and when Japan was no longer 
prepared to concede heavy industrial and military superiority to the West, 
and sought control of the required oil, rubber, etc., the results were 
cataclysmic.  
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Maoist political 
economy, while undoubtedly revolutionary in many ways, also mimicked 
certain features of the high Qing. Formally speaking, collectivization made 
everyone a proletarian, but rural commune members, like smallholders or 
secure tenants, had guaranteed access to farm work; they earned incomes 
based on their average, not their marginal product, and were able to have 
families. (Combined with the end of infanticide, this also ended the problem 
of male ‘bare sticks’ – at least for a generation.) Massive (if sometimes 
counterproductive) efforts were made to industrialize the countryside, 
rather than assuming that higher living standards would have to come from 
moving people out of the countryside; in fact, migration to cities was 
essentially banned from 1960 to about 1985. State funds were again directed 
from wealthier to poorer regions, and (in spite of the disasters of the Great 
Leap Forward) considerable emphasis was placed on insuring a basic level 
of security for poor people and fragile regions. Some of the biggest 
successes of the Maoist period – Yellow and Huai River control, and the 
massive implementation of tube well irrigation, all focused on North and 
Northwest China – echoed Qing initiatives, albeit with more powerful 
techniques. Though per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth did 
not match those of the post-Mao years, life expectancy nearly doubled 
between 1950 and 1976, literacy soared, and so on. 
An enormous amount has changed since 1978, but not everything. 
For all the glitter of Shanghai and Shenzhen, the heart of the boom, until 
the mid-1990s, was in rural industry, some of which built on the earlier 
development of healthy, disciplined, and sometimes skilled labour. Despite 
rapid urban growth, China remains more rural than other comparably 
industrial countries, past or present: it is only slightly more urban today than 
Britain in 1840, though it is far more industrial. Rural income is now more 




than ⅔ from non-agricultural activities, close to the figure for Taiwan in the 
1980s; in South Korea, by contrast, only 20% of rural income comes from 
non-farm activities, and in India 45%. In absolute terms, rural population 
kept growing until about 1998 – far longer into industrialization than in 
most of the West and much more like the experiences of Japan and Taiwan. 
Even today, the government continues to promote this pattern of 
development; significant obstacles to urban-rural migration remain, and 
‘leave the farm but not the village’ remains a common (though increasingly 
threadbare) slogan. Lots of industrial and service households have 
somebody who works at least part-time in agriculture; and despite low 
returns to farming, many families want to keep that toehold, for security 
and other reasons. Rural non-farm income is also supposed to supply the 
capital for improvements to agriculture, and in some localities for welfare 
subsidies to farmers.  
And if we look at things regionally, we again see familiar patterns, but 
taken to new extremes: this rural industrialization is again very concentrated 
in coastal areas (though it takes in somewhat more of the coast than 
before): as of a few years ago, over half of them were in three provinces. 
And those areas are again more oriented towards a wider world than 
towards the rest of China; the ratio of foreign trade to GDP for China’s 
richest provinces now far exceeds the highest levels reached in Japanese 
history, for instance. Both exports and imports play a role here, as coastal 
China is importing hugely increased amounts of oil, metals, raw cotton, 
lumber, and so on – just as Japan, Taiwan and Korea have come to do. 
(Meanwhile the coast is also catching up to other East Asian economies in 
using resources efficiently – its energy consumption per dollar of GDP for 
instance, has dropped almost to South Korean levels, while in the Western 
provinces it is 2.5 to 3 times higher.) 
But therein lie several problems. For one, China – being six times the 
population of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan – cannot ever import the quantities 
of primary products per capita that they do. And energy efficiency – one 
relatively good gauge of resource saving efforts – has started worsening 
again after 20 years of significant improvement. For another, there is deep 
concern about the unprecedented extent of regional inequalities in China – 
and agricultural incomes now lag so far behind that guaranteed access to 
land is no longer enough to keep people in rural areas that lack industry – as 
many rural regions in the North, West, and Southwest do. (The gap 





among the largest in the world; by contrast, in much of Latin America, 
where extreme inequality in landholding led people to head for the cities 
whether there were jobs there or not, that gap is close to zero.) Until 
recently, most Chinese urbanization was what sociologists call ‘urbanization 
in place’: villages turning into towns and towns into cities without most 
people moving far. But now the predominant motor of urbanization is 
migration: a net flow of about 14 million people a year leave the 
countryside, expected to exceed 20 million a year in the next decade. And 
while up to now, China has largely avoided creating vast urban slums 
without basic infrastructure – like those that ring Manila or Mexico City – 
this achievement will become increasingly difficult to sustain. To use a 
different comparison, China’s recent and projected urbanization rates 
roughly track Japan’s, with a 50 year lag – but when Japan began its really 
rapid urbanization in the 1950s, its unemployment rate was 2%, so even as 
the cities bulged, everyone found jobs. Nobody is certain what China’s 
unemployment rate is, but it is a lot more than 2%. 
One response to these looming crises has been the ‘go West’ 
initiative: a massive government-funded campaign emphasizing mining, 
hydropower construction, and other capital-intensive, resource-oriented 
projects in Western China, designed to jumpstart regional growth and 
generate primary products for the East. Han Chinese migration to these 
areas (long restricted to avoid provoking resentment) is now being 
encouraged in part to fill skilled jobs in development projects – and as we 
saw last past spring in Tibet, this provokes plenty of resentment. Areas once 
off-limits for development are now being opened, often over local protests. 
In general, a long-standing paternalism towards minorities here (which, 
granted, has been eroding for some time) is now being decisively pushed 
aside, replaced by a bet that there is a consumer inside everyone, and its 
karaoke bars rather than cultural protection, that will reconcile Tibetans, 
Uighurs, and other minority nationalities in Western China to the Peoples 
Republic China. This initiative also carries huge ecological risks: logging at 
high elevations where regrowth is slow and erosion fast, quick and dirty 
mining, diversion of water from the Himalayan snow melt, and so on. Over 
half of all hydro dams in Tibet built since 1949 are now silted up, and many 
new ones throughout China are expected to last less than 20 years.  
In one sense, of course, ‘go West’ is an effort to stitch the country 
together, both in terms of increasing interdependence and reducing 
economic (and perhaps eventually ethnic) differences. But for now, it also 




raises the possibility of other differences. 63% of industry in coastal 
provinces is now privately-owned – and some of the new rich are now 
shaping local society more generally. Meanwhile the far West is seeing a 
revival of state (often military)-led development (less than 20% of its 
industry is private); so it is not hard to imagine increasing political, as well as 
economic dualism. Amidst the radical changes on the coast, one sees 
interesting continuities with earlier iterations of an ‘East Asian path’; but 
rather than spreading across the country, this pattern seems to be 
stimulating interior developments that instead evoke colonial enclave 
economies, some Maoist campaigns, and crash development efforts in 
Soviet central Asia and Siberia.  
So East Asian patterns of development – marked both by distinctive 
factor endowments, and particular kinds of markets and other institution – 
have surely mattered and continue to do so. But over time their articulation 
with a global economy has become increasingly important, and many of 
their distinctive features – a focus on rural development, property rights 
that slowed urbanization and encouraged rural light industry etc., have been 
altered, while others – such as trading these light industrial products for 
primary product imports, subsidizing continued farming of semi–arid areas, 
and filling up internal frontiers – are now reaching limits, with much of the 
country still poor. Thus the possibilities for spreading the ‘East Asian’ path 
across the Chinese interior may be limited by environmental and social 
contradictions that ultimately resemble those which have also limited the 
diffusion of the very different North Atlantic path to modernity: and the 
‘Great Divergence’ of the coming decades may be less between China and 
the West than between China’s own coastal East and interior West. 
